Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Volume 48
Number 2 Supreme Court

Article 10

Winter 2015

Culpability Through Anonymity: Why Navarette v. California Vastly
Lowers the Standard for Reasonable Suspicion Based Solely on
Anonymous Tips
Joshua Aberman

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr

Recommended Citation
Joshua Aberman, Culpability Through Anonymity: Why Navarette v. California Vastly Lowers the Standard
for Reasonable Suspicion Based Solely on Anonymous Tips, 48 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 539 (2015).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol48/iss2/10

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

CULPABILITY THROUGH ANONYMITY: WHY
NAVARETTE V. CALIFORNIA VASTLY
LOWERS THE STANDARD FOR REASONABLE
SUSPICION BASED SOLELY ON
ANONYMOUS TIPS
Joshua Aberman∗
I. INTRODUCTION
“Report Drunk Drivers, Call 911.” All California motorists, or at
least those who pay attention to signs posted along the highway, are
familiar with this simple message.1 Beginning in 2007, the California
Office of Traffic Safety began a series of driving under the influence
(DUI) crackdown campaigns, prominently featuring these signs as a
means of raising awareness of, and combating, drunk driving.2 The
goal behind these signs is a simple one: to encourage motorists who
observe erratic driving behavior to report any suspected drunk
drivers so that police can investigate and take appropriate action.3
Given the undeniably devastating effect that drunk driving wreaks
upon families and communities alike, there is tremendous support for
efforts to curtail and punish this destructive behavior.4
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Sociology,
University of California, Davis, 2010. Thank you to Professor Justin Levitt for his guidance and
valuable feedback in preparing this Comment. Thank you to the members of the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review for their hard work and dedication. A special thank you to my sister and
personal editor-in-chief for her help. Finally, thank you to my parents and family for their
unconditional support and encouragement.
1. DUI Crackdown, CAL. OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, http://www.ots.ca.gov/media_and
_research/Campaigns/2010_December_DUI_Crackdown/default.asp (last visited Aug. 6, 2014)
(“How often have you seen someone driving down the road that you were pretty sure was drunk,
or at least driving dangerously? Haven’t you said to yourself, ‘I wish a police officer was here to
see this and pull this guy over!’ Now . . . you can do something to help get drunk drivers off the
road.”).
2. See Past Campaigns, CAL. OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, http://www.ots.ca.gov/Media
_and_Research/Campaigns/Past_Campaigns/default.asp (last visited Aug. 6, 2014).
3. DUI Crackdown, supra note 1.
4. Impaired Driving: Get the Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
(Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/impaired_driving/impaired-drv

539

540

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:539

However, while stopping drunk driving is a necessary pursuit,
California’s implementation of a system centered on encouraging
motorists to report suspected drunk drivers is not a perfect one.
While these tips may direct police to potential drunk drivers, they do
not authorize the police to execute investigative stops, searches, or
seizures that fail to comport with the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. In fact, the Fourth Amendment, which protects “against
unreasonable searches and seizures,”5 is seriously undermined when
police can justify a search based on nothing more than an
uncorroborated tip, left anonymously,6 which may have been
provided for a malicious reason such as to embarrass the target or to
create a pretense to search for evidence of other crimes.7
Chief among these concerns, from a constitutional standpoint, is
that individuals may avail themselves of the opportunity to report
drunk drivers anonymously.8 The resulting problem, entirely distinct
from the issue of drunk driving, is when, and under what
circumstances, a police officer can pull a car over based on an
anonymous tip. The United States Supreme Court confronted this
issue during its 2013 term in Navarette v. California.9
In Navarette, a bare majority of the Supreme Court decided
what it termed a “close case” and concluded that an anonymous tip
reporting reckless driving gives police reasonable suspicion to pull
over the identified car.10 On the other hand, the four dissenting

_factsheet.html (“Every day, almost 30 people in the United States die in motor vehicle crashes
that involve an alcohol-impaired driver. This amounts to one death every 48 minutes. The annual
cost of alcohol-related crashes totals more than $51 billion.”).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. Public Information—Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFETY,
http://www.ots.ca.gov/Media_and_Research/Campaigns/2008_December_DUI_Crackdown/Publi
c_Information/FAQs.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2014).
7. E.g., Bradley Zint, Private Eye Takes the 5th More Than 200 Times in Fake-DUI Case,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-private-detective-dui
-lawsuit-20140324-story.html (detailing how a private detective falsely reported that a mayor was
driving erratically and likely drunk); Marin County Family Falls Victim To ‘Swatting,’ Hoax 911
Calls Become Growing Problem For Police, CBS SF BAY AREA (Sept. 3, 2014, 8:01 PM),
http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/09/03/marin-county-family-falls-victim-to-swatting-hoax
-911-calls-become-growing-problem-for-police-prank-fairfax-celebrities-kardashian-justin
-bieber-ashton-kutcher/ (describing several incidents of hoax 911 calls in California).
8. Public Information—Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6 (“[Q:] Do I have to give
my name if I call to report a suspected drunk driver? [A:] No. You can remain anonymous.”
(emphasis removed)).
9. 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
10. Id. at 1692.
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Justices opined that the Court’s decision amounted to a “freedom
destroying cocktail.”11
Part II of this Comment discusses the factual background of
Navarette. Part III considers the relevant legal background informing
investigative stops and reasonable suspicion based on anonymous
tips. Part IV sets forth the reasoning that the Court adopted in
holding that the police officers’ investigative stop did not violate the
Fourth Amendment because the officers had reasonable suspicion of
an ongoing crime based on an anonymous tip. Part V questions the
faulty reasoning and inconsistent application of precedent that forms
the basis of the Navarette decision. Ultimately, Part VI concludes
with the likely practical consequences of the Navarette decision,
focusing on the probable expansion of police officers’ discretion to
conduct investigatory stops based on anonymous tips at the cost of
individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 23, 2008, a 911 emergency dispatcher received a call
from an anonymous12 motorist.13 The motorist claimed that she had
just been run off the road by a reckless driver.14 The motorist then
supplied the 911 dispatcher with the make, model, and license plate
number of the car.15 The 911 dispatcher passed this tip to a
California Highway Patrol (CHP) police dispatcher, who recorded
and broadcasted the message to police as “[s]howing southbound
Highway 1 at mile marker 88, Silver Ford 150 pickup. Plate of 8–
David–94925. Ran the reporting party off the roadway and was last
seen approximately five [minutes] ago.”16
Based on this tip, a CHP officer responded to Highway 1 and
located a silver truck, with a license plate matching the one reported
11. Id. at 1697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. The caller actually identified herself by name in the 911 recording. See id. at 1687 n. 1
(majority opinion). However, the trial court and all subsequent reviewing courts treated the caller
as anonymous because the 911 recording was not introduced into evidence during the suppression
hearing, meaning that the caller’s identity was not part of the record. Id.; see also Garrett Epps,
Can an Anonymous Tip Get You Arrested for Drunk Driving?, THE ATLANTIC (May 14, 2014,
9:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/05/navarettevcalifornia/370803/?sin
gle_page=true (explaining why the 911 call was not introduced during the suppression hearing).
13. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686–87.
14. Id. at 1687.
15. Id. at 1686–87.
16. Id.
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by the anonymous tipster, around thirteen minutes after the dispatch
call, at mile marker 69.17 The CHP officer followed the truck for
approximately five minutes.18 During this period, the operator of the
truck did not drive erratically or perform any other vehicular
maneuvers that would have given the surveilling police officers
probable cause to pull over a motorist.19 Nevertheless, the officer
pulled over the truck and was soon joined by a second officer who
had separately responded to the broadcasted message.20
When the two officers approached the truck, they smelled
marijuana.21 The officers subsequently searched the vehicle and
discovered thirty pounds of marijuana in the truck bed.22 As a result,
the officers arrested the driver of the truck, Lorenzo Navarette, and
his passenger and brother, José Navarette.23
At trial, the Navarette brothers sought to suppress the evidence
seized during the search of the truck. They argued the arresting
officers pulled over the vehicle without the requisite reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity that would have made the search
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.24 The trial
judge rejected this argument and admitted the seized marijuana into
evidence.25 The Navarette brothers pleaded guilty to transporting
marijuana and received a sentence of ninety days in jail and three
years of probation.26 The California Court of Appeal affirmed the
trial court’s determination as to the marijuana’s admissibility and the
Navarette brothers’ subsequent sentencing.27 The California Supreme
Court declined to review the case and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.28

17. Id. at 1687.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 1687; id. at 1696 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the driving during the five
minutes of surveillance was “irreproachable” and that the officers did not witness a single traffic
law violation).
20. Id. at 1687 (majority opinion).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. People v. Navarette, No. A132353, 2012 WL 4842651 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2012),
aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
28. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court began its analysis with a holding first
articulated in its seminal decision Terry v. Ohio,29 and subsequently
developed by numerous cases: “in justifying the particular intrusion
the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion.”30 This standard, which is
commonly referred to as reasonable suspicion,31 is determined under
the totality of the circumstances32 and “is dependent upon both the
content of information possessed by police and its degree of
reliability.”33
These general principles governing Terry stops are particularly
important in cases where the reasonable suspicion for the Terry stop
is justified by an anonymous tip. The Court’s jurisprudence in this
area is buttressed by two guidepost decisions determining whether an
anonymous tip can provide reasonable suspicion: Alabama v. White34
and Florida v. J.L.35
In White, a divided Court held that an anonymous tip provided
police officers with reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative
stop. The White tipster predicted that a woman named Vanessa
White would leave a certain apartment building at a particular time,
driving a distinct brown, Plymouth station wagon with a broken tail
light, en route to a local motel, and carrying a brown attaché
containing cocaine.36 The officers placed Ms. White under
surveillance and confirmed almost all of the detailed predictions of
the anonymous tip.37 The Court found it significant that the tipster
was able to predict the future actions of a third party, ultimately

29. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
30. Id. The Navarette Court relied on a slightly different phrasing of this principle: “a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity.” 134 S. Ct. at 1687 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)).
31. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214,
217–23 (1983).
32. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417.
33. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
34. Id.
35. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
36. White, 496 U.S. at 327.
37. Id. The Court noted that the officers did not corroborate every part of the tip, such as the
name of the woman, but did corroborate the majority of the tipster’s predictions. See id. at 331.
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holding that “the anonymous tip, as corroborated, exhibited sufficient
indicia of reliability to justify [an] investigatory stop.”38
On the other hand, in J.L., a unanimous Court held that an
anonymous tip did not provide reasonable suspicion for an
investigative stop.39 The anonymous tipster in J.L. reported that a
young black male would be standing at a particular bus stop, wearing
a plaid shirt, and carrying a gun.40 The Court held that this tip lacked
the indicia of reliability present in White.41 Specifically, the Court
primarily focused on the lack of a predictive assertion revealing the
tipster’s special familiarity with the suspect, and subsequent police
corroboration of the tip, which failed to sufficiently justify the
police’s investigative stop.42 Furthermore, the Court expressly
refused to find that the anonymous tip was reliable based on the tip’s
description of readily observable information regarding location and
appearance because such information does not reveal how a tipster
has knowledge of concealed criminal activity.43
IV. THE REASONING OF THE COURT
A. Majority Opinion
Writing for the Navarette majority,44 Justice Thomas began his
analysis of the anonymous tip’s reliability by observing that the
anonymous informant, by virtue of claiming that she was run off the
road, possessed eyewitness knowledge of the alleged reckless
driving.45 This first-hand knowledge entitled the tip to increased
reliability.46 Furthermore, the majority reasoned that this knowledge
made the reliability of the anonymous tipster stronger than that of the
38. Id. at 332. For a discussion criticizing the White Court’s decision to find reasonable
suspicion based on an anonymous tip, see Orrin S. Shifrin, Fourth Amendment—Protection
Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure: The Inadequacies of Using an Anonymous Tip to
Provide Reasonable Suspicion for an Investigatory Stop, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 760
(1991).
39. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 271.
42. Id. at 272–74.
43. Id. at 272.
44. Justice Thomas was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Alito, and
Kennedy.
45. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689.
46. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983) (“[An informant’s] explicit and
detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed
firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case.”)).
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tipster in either White or J.L. because the police officers definitively
knew how the Navarette tipster allegedly came to acquire her
information.47 And, as with both cases, the detaining police officer
was able to corroborate the tip’s factual assertions as to the car’s
defining characteristics and approximate location.48
Additionally, the majority relied on principles of evidentiary
admissibility to hold that the tip was reliable.49 The Court looked to
the timeline of events to infer the approximate time of the
near-accident and concluded that the account of the accident given
during the 911 call amounted to either a present sense impression or
an excited utterance.50 These types of statements are considered more
reliable than most other out-of-court statements.51 Moreover, the
Court reasoned that the fact that the call was placed to 911, which
allows for recording, identifying, and tracing calls, ameliorates the
potential for abuses of anonymous tips and increases the reliability of
reports placed into such a system.52
The Court next looked to whether the tip created reasonable
suspicion of ongoing criminal activity so as to justify an investigative
stop under Terry.53 Therefore, the court was confronted with the
issue of whether the tip, which described precisely one incident of
reckless driving and contained no express assertion of drunk driving,
created “reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime such as drunk
driving.”54 While noting that not all traffic violations imply
intoxication, the Court relied on data analyzing symptoms of drunk
driving to conclude that an allegation of weaving or driving over a
center median line implies drunkenness.55 The Court then reasoned
that the allegation that the informant had been run off the road was
the type of conduct that “bears too great a resemblance to
paradigmatic manifestations of drunk driving” because it “suggests
47. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1688–89.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1689–90.
50. Id. at 1689.
51. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(1), 803(2)).
52. Id. at 1689–90.
53. Id. at 1690–92.
54. Id. at 1690.
55. Id. at 1690–91. The Court relied on “the accumulated experience of thousands
of officers” to determine which types of “erratic behaviors are strongly correlated with
drunk driving.” Id. at 1691 (citing NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., THE
VISUAL DETECTION OF DWI MOTORISTS 4–5 (Mar. 2010), available at
http://nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/808677.pdf).
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lane-positioning problems, decreased vigilance, impaired judgment,
or some combination of those recognized drunk driving cues.”56 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court expressly found that the fact that
the police officers had not personally observed any driving behaviors
associated with drunk driving, which undermines rather than
corroborates the anonymous tip, did not invalidate the officer’s
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop.57
The Court concluded that while this was a “close case,” the
anonymous tip had sufficient indicia of reliability such that, under
the totality of the circumstances, the police officers had reasonable
suspicion to execute an investigative stop.58 As a result, the Supreme
Court affirmed the California Court of Appeal and ruled the evidence
collected during the traffic stop admissible.59
B. Dissent
Writing for the dissenting Justices,60 Justice Scalia emphatically
argued that the anonymous tip that was the subject of the case could
not possibly give rise to reasonable suspicion under Terry, White, or
J.L. Instead, the dissent argued, the majority opinion adopted a
position accepted by several other courts61 but never by the Supreme
Court: that an anonymous and uncorroborated tip regarding a
possibly intoxicated driver provides reasonable suspicion for an
investigative stop.62
Principally, the dissent strongly questioned the majority’s
reliance on White.63 The only predictive value of the Navarette tip
that could have aided the police in assessing the anonymous
informant’s reliability was that a silver truck would be heading south
on Highway 1. This falls far short of the predictive tip in White,
which revealed to the police officers that the anonymous informant
had a basis for knowing the otherwise unobservable fact that
Ms. White would be carrying contraband.64 Instead, the description
56. Id. at 1691.
57. Id. (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002)).
58. Id. at 1692.
59. Id.
60. Justice Scalia was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
61. E.g., United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 729–30; People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 814
(Cal. 2006); State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 626–27, 630 (Iowa 2001).
62. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 1693.
64. Id.
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of the truck and its direction on the highway was information that
would have been immediately discernible to anyone observing the
truck.65 It provided no basis to conclude that the tipster possessed
familiarity with the truck driver’s personal affairs such that the police
could reasonably believe the informant had a basis for the assertion
of illegal activity.66
Next, the dissent criticized the majority for relying on the fact
that the anonymous tip qualified as a present sense impression or an
excited utterance, making the statements more reliable as a matter of
evidentiary law.67 The dissent pointed out that the tip likely lacked
the immediacy necessary to qualify as a present sense impression or
an excited utterance because a significant amount of time necessarily
passed between the near-accident and its anonymous report.68
Moreover, because it was attributed to an anonymous source, the tip
was significantly less likely to enjoy the presumption of reliability
that normally attaches to either present sense impressions or excited
utterances.69 Additionally, the dissent argued that the fact that the
statement was placed to 911, and thus was recorded, did not affect
the reliability of the information, particularly where the informant
was unaware that her call was being recorded and could later be
traced and identified.70
Furthermore, the dissent highlighted that the anonymous tip did
not contain an actual report of drunk driving, instead describing a
single instance of reckless driving.71 Because the standard required to
justify an investigative stop is evidence of ongoing criminal activity,
the dissent argued that a report of a single incident of careless or
reckless driving, explainable by any number of reasons,72 fell far
short of asserting ongoing criminal activity.73

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1694 (citing 2 K. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 362, 367–69 (7th ed. 2013)
[hereinafter MCCORMICK] (“There is no such immediacy here. The declarant had time to observe
the license number of the offending vehicle, . . . to bring her car to a halt, to copy down the
observed license number (presumably), and (if she was using her own cell phone) to dial a call to
the police from the stopped car. Plenty of time to dissemble or embellish.”)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1695.
72. The dissent points to use of a cell phone, an intense sports argument, personal animus
based on a “Make Love, Not War” bumper sticker, carelessness, and recklessness as equally
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Finally, the dissent pointed to the police officer’s decision to
follow the Navarettes’ silver truck for five minutes, ostensibly for the
purpose of confirming reckless driving, as the final blow to any
credible assertion that the police officers possessed reasonable
suspicion of an ongoing crime.74 While lauding this as good police
work, the dissent asserted that the police officer’s failure to identify
any traffic violations within the surveillance period meant that the
anonymous tip was not just uncorroborated, but actively
undermined.75 Therefore, because a drunk driver possesses no ability
to “turn off” the symptoms of drunk driving, the police officer’s
failure to observe any behavior consistent with driving while
intoxicated foreclosed the possibility of any reasonable suspicion of
drunk driving.76 Thus, the dissent would have held that the
investigative stop of the car was unconstitutional.77
V. ANALYSIS
This Comment will analyze the majority’s faulty logic in two
main contexts: first, in finding reliability based on a tip’s contents
qualifying as a hearsay exception, and second, in overstating the
importance of the tip’s permanent recording. Next, this Comment
will evaluate Navarette as an application of J.L., rather than as a
minimization of White’s predictive tip requirement. Finally, it will
examine how lower courts are likely to interpret and apply Navarette
to future cases involving anonymous tips.
A. The Navarette Decision Was Premised on Faulty Reasoning
1. Evidentiary Rules of Trial Admissibility Should Not Inform the
Determination of an Officer’s Reasonable Suspicion
As a matter of evidentiary law, the rule against hearsay requires
that out-of-court statements be excluded at trial when offered for
their truth.78 An exception to this general exclusionary rule attaches
when the statement is a present sense impression or an excited
likely reasons for the Navarettes’ driving behavior which caused the anonymous informant to be
run off the road. Id.
73. Id. at 1695–96.
74. Id. at 1696–97.
75. Id. at 1696.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 1697.
78. FED. R. EVID. 801(c); MCCORMICK, supra note 68, at 182–83.
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utterance, under the rationale that the declarant has not had the
necessary time to fabricate a lie.79 The Navarette dissent makes
strong points regarding the tip’s likelihood of not being sufficiently
immediate to qualify under either of these exceptions.80 It also raises
serious concerns about whether statements that may be classified as
excited utterances or present sense impressions, but for the fact that
they were said anonymously, are entitled to the same presumption of
reliability.81
However, one fundamental question must be asked
preliminarily: Why look to hearsay exceptions to inform the
reliability of an anonymous tip for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment? The evidentiary admissibility of an anonymous tip only
comes into play if police officers act on the anonymous tip, discover
evidence of illegal activity, charges are brought by a prosecutor, and
a judge rules the evidence admissible because it was collected during
a search that was consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Then, and
only then, is a trial held where the tip, as an out-of-court statement,
may be offered for its truth. Duplicating the evidentiary exception
relevant at trial as the indicia of Fourth Amendment compliance in
investigative stops might intuitively seem like a good idea because it
creates consistency in what is “reliable,” but in fact, such a procedure
commits the logical fallacy of circular reasoning.
While it is true that the totality of the circumstances must be
considered to assess the reliability of an anonymous tip, the rationale
for admitting present sense impressions or excited utterances—that
there has been no time to fabricate a lie—is not at all relevant as an
indicia of reliability.82 The Fourth Amendment asks whether an
anonymous tip contains sufficient indicia of reliability to support “a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped of criminal activity,” rather than the likelihood that the
informant fabricated information.83 The required indicia of

79. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (defining a present sense impression as “[a] statement describing or
explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it”); id.
at 803(2) (defining an excited utterance as “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition,
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused”).
80. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1693–94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1694 (citing MCCORMICK, supra note 68, at 367–69).
82. See FED. R. EVID. 401; see FED. R. EVID. 402.
83. United State v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–
22 (1968).
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reliability84 has never previously been informed by whether the tip
ultimately turned out to be true.85 If that were not the case, then the
proper method of analysis would simply ask whether the tip turned
out to be true and then retroactively deem it reliable or unreliable
based on that result.
However, ultimate truth is the only point on which a present
sense impression or excited utterance is more reliable than other
out-of-court statements in the context of admissibility; these types of
spontaneous statements are generally considered to be more reliable
because there has been insufficient time to fabricate them.86 Ultimate
truth neither gives police reason to believe that the informant himself
is more reliable nor provides an anonymous tip with sufficient
indicia of reliability to give rise to reasonable suspicion. This is
necessarily true because a determination as to an anonymous tip’s
ultimate truth can only be made after police have already acted based
on the tip, but reasonable suspicion must exist prior to such action.
Navarette ignores this logic entirely. Instead, under Navarette,
an investigative stop is justified because an anonymous tip qualified
as an excited utterance or present sense impression and, if evidence
of a crime is subsequently uncovered, an individual will be
prosecuted based on a seizure that did not comply with the Fourth
Amendment, thus completing the circular reasoning loop.
Additionally, to the extent that reasonable suspicion requires a
police officer to specifically articulate the grounds for his belief of
ongoing criminal activity, evidentiary rules are wholly irrelevant.87 A
tip is usually conveyed to a police officer through the combination of
a 911 dispatcher and a police dispatcher.88 It is highly improbable
that a police officer, hearing a dispatcher’s report, would think, much
less have sufficient information to conclusively determine, that an
anonymous tip is sufficiently credible because it appears to recount a
84. See Part V.B, infra.
85. In J.L. it did not matter that the defendant was actually found carrying a gun, and in
White it did not matter that the defendant was actually in possession of cocaine. See generally
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990). Indeed, Navarette
held that the police officer possessed reasonable suspicion despite the fact that the defendant was
not ultimately driving while intoxicated. See Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687.
86. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990) (“The basis for the ‘excited utterance’
exception, for example, is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the
possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation . . . .”); MCCORMICK, supra note 68, at 365.
87. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22.
88. See Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686–87.
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very recent event, possibly while the tipster is still in an excited
state.89 As such, the applicability of a hearsay exception could not,
and should not, influence the determination of an anonymous tip’s
reliability.
2. The Navarette Court Created a Per Se Rule Allowing for
Reasonable Suspicion Based on Anonymous
911 Reports of Moving Violations
The Navarette Court listed several laws and regulations that
allow individuals to listen to a false tipster’s voice and subject him or
her to prosecution, and concluded that this increased the veracity of a
tipster’s claims.90 In so doing, the Court purported not to create a
new exception to 911 calls, claiming that “[n]one of this is to suggest
that tips in 911 calls are per se reliable.”91 However, the very next
line of the opinion admits that “a reasonable officer could conclude
that a false tipster would think twice before using such a system.”92
Therefore, the Court’s reasoning can be applied to any recorded
call, 911 or otherwise, and such a call may be used as the basis for a
police officer’s reasonable suspicion.93 Going forward, by way of
analogy to Navarette, the Court created a per se rule recognizing
anonymous tips reported through 911 as sufficiently reliable to
provide an officer with reasonable suspicion, while expressly
purporting not to.
Additionally, even the most reliable tip only justifies an
investigative stop when it creates reasonable suspicion that ongoing
criminal activity may be afoot.94 Therefore, in the context of a 911
phone call reporting suspected drunk driving, the content of the tip
must describe behavior that reasonably leads a police officer to
89. Compare id. (transcribing the dispatchers as: “[s]howing southbound Highway 1 at mile
marker 88, Silver Ford 150 pickup. Plate of 8–David–94925. Ran the reporting party off the
roadway and was last seen approximately five [minutes] ago”), with FED. R. EVID. 803(1)
(requiring a statement nearly contemporaneously with observance), and FED. R. EVID. 803(2)
(requiring a statement made under the stress of excitement of the event).
90. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689–90 (citing 47 CFR § 20.18(d)(1) (2013); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 148.3 (West 2014); id. § 653x (West 2010)).
91. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1690.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 1694 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s discussion of reliable 911
traceability has so little relevance to the present case that one must surmise it has been included
merely to assure officers in the future that anonymous 911 accusations—even untraced ones—are
not as suspect (and hence as unreliable) as other anonymous accusations. That is unfortunate.”).
94. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
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believe that a motorist is driving while intoxicated. To aid in its
determination of which behavior is consistent with drunk driving, the
Supreme Court looked to a study by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA).95
The NHTSA study identified four principal categories of driving
behaviors which suggest a motorist is driving under the influence: (1)
problems in maintaining proper lane positioning; (2) speed and
braking problems; (3) vigilance problems; and (4) judgment
problems.96 More specifically, the study identifies behavior such as
weaving, wide turns, near collisions, driving too quickly, driving too
slowly, responding slowly to traffic signals, failure to signal,
following too closely, and unsafe lane changes, among many others,
as examples of behavior that predicts drunk driving at a statistical
confidence rate of between 35 and 90 percent.97
Of course, reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop
requires far less than certainty of illegal activity.98 While the Court
has never placed an exact percentage on how certain officers must
be, Navarette expressly endorses the NHTSA’s findings of driving
behaviors that predict drunk driving at confidence intervals as low as
35 percent. It follows, then, that a police officer who receives an
anonymous report complaining of any of the more than twenty
driving behaviors identified in the NHTSA study can pull over the
identified car on suspicion of drunk driving.99
As a result of the broad array of behavior that suggests drunk
driving, almost any report of less-than-ideal driving, even absent an
assertion that the tipster believes the offending driver is indeed
drunk, will give police the necessary reasonable suspicion to execute
an investigative stop. This result, enabled by the logic and holding of
the Navarette decision, is repugnant to any traditional concept of
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.100
95. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 55, at 4–5.
96. Id. at 4.
97. Id. at 5.
98. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
99. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 55, at 5.
100. See U.S. CONST. Amend. IV; see also Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Law enforcement agencies follow closely our judgments on matters such as this,
and they will identify at once our new rule: So long as the caller identifies where the car is,
anonymous claims of a single instance of possibly careless or reckless driving, called in to 911,
will support a traffic stop. This is not my concept, and I am sure would not be the Framers’, of a
people secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
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B. Navarette Is Significantly More Analogous to J.L. than to White.
The facts of Navarette are difficult to distinguish from those of
Florida v. J.L.101 At best, the greatest distinction is that the tipster in
J.L. did not explain how he knew that the black male had a gun,102
while the Navarette tipster had personal knowledge of reckless
driving because she was allegedly run off the road.103 However, both
tips contained only factual assertions as to easily observable details
of the subject to be searched—the black male in J.L. and the silver
truck in Navarette—and did not predict any future activity that
necessarily suggested personal knowledge that could be the basis for
reliability.104 The most that could be said of the predictive value of
the Navarette tip, which was not articulated by the Navarette tipster
but was instead inferred from her story, was where along the
Highway the police could expect to find the offending driver.105
Nevertheless, the Navarette Court concluded that the case
presented a situation more similar to White than to J.L.106 However,
the White tip predicted future activity that was not readily observable
or otherwise knowable to someone who did not have personal
knowledge of the activities described within the tip.107 In contrast,
the Navarette tip shares nothing more with the White tip than that
each tip described a car with sufficient specificity for police to
identify the vehicle on the road. Such a description, alone, would not
have previously risen to the level of reliability and predictive content
necessary to support reasonable suspicion for an investigate stop.
Therefore, at least in the context of reports of erratic driving,
Navarette represents a tremendous expansion of police power to
detain and investigate the purported subject of an anonymous tip.108

101. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
102. Id. at 271.
103. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689. For a more detailed discussion of the connection between
one instance of reckless driving and suspicion of the ongoing crime of drunk driving, see Part
V.A.2, supra.
104. See J.L., 266 U.S. at 268–69; see Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686.
105. See Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686–87.
106. See id. at 1692 (“Like White, this is a ‘close case.’”).
107. Id. at 1688.
108. Navarette does not represent the first time the Court has inconsistently applied
exceptions in the arena of DUI investigations. Compare Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (holding that a suspicionless DUI checkpoint is constitutional), with City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (holding that a suspicionless drug checkpoint is
unconstitutional).
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C. Predicting the Future After Navarette
As a practical reality, the Court’s decision in Navarette will
have broad-sweeping consequences for reasonable suspicion based
on anonymous tips. In arguing the case, California’s primary position
was that the governmental interest in stopping drunk driving and
protecting citizens was so great that the reasonable suspicion
required to justify an investigative stop was necessarily lower than in
other cases.109 Notably, both the majority and dissenting opinions in
Navarette wholly omitted any discussion of this position.110
While a cursory reading of the opinion might suggest that the
Court implicitly rejected California’s argument for an augmented
balancing test, a more in-depth examination reveals that California,
and by extension all state and federal governments, got far more than
what they argued for in their brief.111
As discussed in Section V.A.1, the Court found that a tip
containing either a present sense impression or excited utterance is
inherently reliable. And as discussed in Section V.A.2, the Court also
reasoned that a tip recorded through 911 is more reliable because the
call can be traced back to the tipster, and a false tip might subject
him to criminal liability. In sum, these two justifications amount to
an easy-to-satisfy formula for finding reasonable suspicion based on
anonymous tips because most reports of emergencies are placed
through 911 and describe events that took place recently enough to
qualify, under Navarette, as present sense impressions or excited
109. Respondent’s Brief On The Merits at 10, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014)
(No.
12-9490),
2013
WL
6673706,
at
*10,
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v3/12
-9490_resp.authcheckdam.pdf (“[T]he importance of the governmental interest is an
indispensable component of reasonableness balancing.”). Indeed, the Argument section of
California’s brief consists of six sections, the point headings for four of which contain the phrase
“governmental interest.” Id. at ii–iii. California’s position was supported by the United States,
thirty-two other states and the District of Columbia. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 19–25, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (No. 12-9490),
2013 WL 6805695, at *19–25; Brief of Florida, 31 other states, and the District of Columbia as
Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondent, State of California at 21–24, Navarette v. California,
134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (No. 12-9490), 2013 WL 6805695, at *21–24.
110. See generally Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
111. The Court appeared motivated to provide a clear rule for law enforcement officers,
which had previously been missing in cases involving DUI stops. E.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 133
S. Ct. 1552, 1569 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“But the
circumstances in drunk driving cases are often typical, and the Court should be able to offer
guidance on how police should handle cases.”). The same judges that did not fully join the
majority opinion in McNeely joined the majority in Navarette. Id. at 1556.
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utterances. This formula can be satisfied in multiple scenarios
beyond drunk driving, including situations where the governmental
interest may not be as high, or where such interest is radically
different from the interest of protecting the public’s safety by
eliminating drunk driving.112 Instead, the governmental interest in
responding to 911 calls supplants the governmental interest intimated
by the factual circumstances of the particular emergency reported
within the call, and satisfies the reasonable suspicion requirement in
one step.
In today’s day and age of mass data storage, nearly all 911 calls
are recorded and, in most states, copies of all emergency calls are
even made available to the public.113 Because of such laws, after
Navarette there is no doubt that a police officer can constitutionally
act on any tip placed with 911, so long as the tip provides some
reason to believe that any criminal activity is ongoing.114 Simply put,
the Fourth Amendment requires more before police officers may
constitutionally initiate a search and seizure.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s holding in Navarette allows police to
constitutionally perform an investigative stop in situations where
they previously would not have had reasonable suspicion to do so.
Going forward, with this precedent in mind, police will almost
always be justified in deciding to pull over a motorist to investigate
an anonymous report of drunk driving. The “evil” of this result is not
immediately apparent. After all, no police officer or judge wants to
explain to a grieving mother that her son was killed by a drunk driver
112. At oral argument, the Court spent considerable time discussing hypotheticals involving
anonymous tips describing a bomb or a kidnapped girl. E.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 17–
20, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (No. 12-9490). In particular, Chief Justice
Roberts expressed doubt about a rule in Navarette that would limit police officer’s ability to
constitutionally act on anonymous tips dealing with such important subjects. Id.
113. See State Laws Relating to Confidentiality of 9-1-1 Call Recordings and Photographs of
Emergency
Scenes,
NAT’L
CONFERENCE
OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/confidentiality-of
-911-call-recordings.aspx (last updated Dec. 27, 2013) (surveying state law and concluding that
only twelve states place restrictions on 911 call recordings).
114. Although the foundation for such a rule had been laid since as early as J.L., the Court
had never previously authorized such an exception to the reasonable suspicion requirement of a
Terry stop. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274–76 (2000) (Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts,
C.J., concurring) (opining that an anonymous tip is reliable when an anonymous informant places
his identity at risk through a voice recording).
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because, despite an anonymous tip reporting the motorist as a
potential drunk driver, the police officer was constitutionally
restricted to following the vehicle until he personally observed
erratic driving behavior that would justify an investigative stop. The
Navarette rule serves to protect the son’s life, whether he is the
drunk driver that is the subject of the anonymous tip or the innocent
victim, by allowing police to immediately stop a car that was the
subject of an anonymous tip.
Instead, the “evil” of Navarette—the previously impermissible
incursion into Fourth Amendment rights—lies in the logic by which
the Court reached its decision. The Court’s reasoning is unlikely to
influence police in the line of duty who can premise an investigatory
stop on the most minor of moving violations, including failure to
show a turn signal and driving too quickly or too slowly.115 On the
other hand, Navarette will be tremendously influential to the trial and
magistrate judges who are tasked daily with assessing the
constitutionality of police officers’ actions. The signal to them is
clear: police always have reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry
stop based on an anonymous report of subpar driving behavior.
More dire still, an anonymous tip left through 911 that provides
information regarding ongoing criminal activity—DUI-related or
not—must now be given a presumption of reliability because the 911
call is recorded. As such, Navarette portends to recreate and
significantly lower the standard by which all anonymous tips are
deemed to give rise to reasonable suspicion justifying a police
investigative stop. The inevitable effect is that all American citizens
are less secure in their Fourth Amendment right to freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures.

115. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 55, at 4–5.

